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Copyright, Independent Contractors, and the Work-for-Hire
Doctrine: Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
In 1976 Congress modernized American copyright law, overhauling a stat-
ute that had been in effect since the turn of the century.' The Copyright Act of
19762 made fundamental changes in the nation's copyright system.3 Just before
the new Act went into effect,4 the Register of Copyrights remarked that "[i]ittle
has remained the same." 5
The extent of one of these changes remains unclear. The United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals have split over how much the Copyright Act of 1976
changed copyright's work-for-hire doctrine, which provides that employers own
the copyright in works created by their employees; although the employee cre-
ated the copyrighted work, his employer is regarded as its statutory "author."
The doctrine was first codified in the Copyright Act of 1909 which simply stated
that an employer was the author of a "work made for hire," 6 and left the devel-
opment of the doctrine to the courts. The 1976 Act provides that an employer is
the author of a work made for hire, but it also describes a "work made for hire"
as "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment."'7 Neither the 1976 Act nor its legislative history defines the key term
"employee."' 8 The controversy among the circuits centers on the meaning of the
word "employee" and whether the new Act overruled a line of cases decided
under the 1909 Act that treated independent contractors as "employees" under
the copyright laws.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, generally re-
garded as the premier copyright court in the nation,9 was the first circuit to
1. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1947); Pub.
L. No. 281, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (1947) (repealed 1976).
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
3. See infira note 40. The most significant change was the creation of a single federal system of
copyright protection, replacing a dual system of federal protection for published works and state
protection for unpublished works. Other changes include replacement of two 28-year terms with a
single term, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)-(c) (1982); Pub. L. No. 281, ch. 391, § 24, 61 Stat. 659, 659
(1947) (repealed 1976), recognition of divisibility of the exclusive rights comprising a copyright, see
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1982), recognition of an author's inalienable right to terminate transfers and
licenses of copyright after a specified period of time, see id. § 203, codification of the equitable doc-
trine of fair use, see id. § 107 (reasonable use of a copyrighted work for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research is not infringement), and a definition of
"work made for hire," see id. § 101, which is the subject of this Note.
4. The Copyright Act of 1976 became effective January 1, 1978. Pub. L. 94-553. § 102, 90
Stat. 2598 (1976).
5. Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 477, 479
(1977).
6. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (1909) (repealed
1947); Pub. L. No. 281, ch. 391, § 26, 61 Stat. 652, 660 (1947) (repealed 1976).
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 at 3, 201(b) (1982).
8. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][1], at 5-12 (1988).
9. Easter Seal Soe'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325
(5th Cir. 1987) (The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is "the de facto Copy-
right Court of the United States"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988); Gracen v. Bradford Exch,,
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interpret the new work-for-hire provisions. The Second Circuit held that the
1976 Act changed the work-for-hire doctrine only slightly: an independent con-
tractor is still an "employee" if she is closely supervised by the hiring party.10
In Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid 1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's view
and held that the 1976 Act radically changed the work-for-hire doctrine: an
independent contractor is never an "employee" under copyright law.12  This
view, known as the "literal" interpretation, has received almost unanimous sup-
port from commentators.
13
698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is "the
nation's premier copyright court").
10. Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
982 (1984). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted the Second Cir-
cuit's interpretation in Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
11. 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
12. Id. at 1487, 1494. The District of Columbia Circuit joined the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which was the first circuit to reject the Second Circuit's interpretation
and adopt the literal interpretation of the 1976 Act's new work-for-hire provisions. See Easter Seal
Soe'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 324, 333-36 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988). Recently, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's view
and the literal view adopted by the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits. See infra notes 84-85
and accompanying text.
13. For examples of scholarly commentary discussing the legislative history of the 1976 Act
and supporting a literal interpretation, see CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OMNIBUS COPY-
RIGHT REVISION 101-05 (1973) (examining S. 1361, 93d Cong, 1st Sess. (1973), whose work-for-hire
provisions were almost identical to those in the 1976 Act); 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note
8, § 5.03[B][2][a]; W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 118-25 (6th ed. 1986); Angel &
Tanenbaum, Works Madefor Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 209, 230-32 (1976); Colby,
Copyright Revision Revisited: Commissioned Works as Worksfor Hire Under the United States Copy-
right Act, 5 WHITrIER L. REV. 492, 505-12 (1983); Fidlow, The "Works Made for Hire" Doctrine
and the Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: The Needfor Congressional Clarification, 10
HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 591, 601-08 (1988); Fitzgibbon & Kendall, The Unicorn in the Court-
room: The Concept of "Supervising and Directing" an Artistic Creation Is a Mythical Beast in the
Copyright Law, 15 J. ARTS MGMT. & L., Fall 1985, at 23, 23-24, 38-40; Gallay, Authorship and
Copyright of Works Made for Hire: Bugs in the Statutory System, 8 ART & L. 573, 579-82 (1984);
Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinter-
pretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1289-95 (1987); Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of
Employment-What Congress Really Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 210, 221-43 (1988);
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 888-91 (1987);
Ossola, Work for Hire: A Judicial Quagmire and a Legislative Solution, 17 J. ARTS MGMT. & L.,
Fall 1987, at 23, 31-35; Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They "Works Madefor Hire" Under the 1976
Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & UNIV. L. 485, 492-95 (1982-83); Note, The Creative Commissioner: Com-
missioned Works Under the Copyright Act of1976, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 373, 381-86 (1987); Comment,
Free Lance Artists, Worksfor Hire, and the Copyright Act o/1976, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 703, 707-
09 & n.21 (1982); Note, The Works Made for Hire Doctrine Under the Copyright Act of 1976-A
Misinterpretation: Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 649, 655-56, 665-67
(1986); Note, The Freelancer's Trap: Workfor Hire Under the Copyright Act of1976, 86 W. VA. L.
REV. 1305, 1320-21 (1984). But see O'Meara, "Works Madefor Hire" Under the Copyright Act of
1976-Two Interpretations, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 523, 526, 533-34 (1982) (because the work-for-
hire provisions were a compromise, "many different opinions [were] expressed over the years, [so] it
is possible to recite legislative history in support of nearly any interpretation of work made for hire";
"[i]f Congress had intended to make sweeping changes with respect to works prepared by independ-
ent contractors, it would have been clearly mentioned in the [House] [R]eport"). For a discussion of
the different interpretations of the work-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act,'see infra notes 72-101
and accompanying text. Cf. Comment, The Works Madefor Hire Doctrine ofthe 1976 Copyright Act
After Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel, Inc., 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 265, 275 (text supports
literal as well as conservative interpretations).
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If a work is "made for hire," this status has important consequences. The
employer, and not the creator, owns the copyright in that work.' 4 The creator
loses his right to terminate transfers and licenses of the copyright t5 and the
copyright expires after a certain number of years, instead of fifty years after the
death of the creator. 16 Because forty percent of all copyright registrations are
works for hire, the courts' interpretation of what is a "work made for hire"
affects thousands of business transactions. 17 The need for clarification of the
doctrine is acute.' 8 The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Reid and will examine the work-for-hire doctrine this term.' 9
This Note traces the development of the work-for-hire doctrine under the
Copyright Act of 190920 and examines the wording and legislative history of the
work-for-hire provisions in the Copyright Act of 1976.21 The Note explains
three interpretations of the work-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act 22 and con-
cludes that the literal interpretation construing the term "employee" as a regu-
lar, salaried employee is the best approach.
In the fall of 1985, the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), a
group organized to end homelessness in America, decided to enter a display in
the District of Columbia's annual Christmas Pageant of Peace.23 CCNV's idea
for a sculpture that would dramatize the plight of the homeless were specific and
detailed: a nativity scene called "Third World America" depicting the Holy
Family as contemporary homeless people huddled over a streetside steam
grate.24 CCNV contacted James Earl Reid, a Baltimore sculptor, who was eager
14. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (1982) (copyright vests initially in the author, but an employer is
considered the author of a work made for hire).
15. Id. § 203(a) (in the case of any work other than a work made for hire, transfers and licenses
of copyright may be terminated after 35 years).
16. Id. § 302(a), (c) (copyright endures for the life of the author plus 50 years, but copyright in
a work made for hire endures for 75 years from the year of its first publication, or 100 years from the
year of its creation, whichever expires first).
17. Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment-What Congress Really Intended, 35 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 210, 210 (1988). Work-for-hire also presents problems in the university
setting. See, e.g., DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 17 (1984) (new copyright law may interfere with traditional arrangement that academicians
own copyright in their works); Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They "Works Made for Hire" Under
the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & UNIv. L. 485 (1982-83) (custom that a professor retains copyright
in scholarly writings is threatened by work-for-hire provisions of new Copyright Act).
18. See, e.g., Fidlow, The "Works Made for Hire" Doctrine and the Employee/Independent
Contractor Dichotomy: The Need for Congressional Clarification, 10 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
591, 597, 619-20 (1988); Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1281, 1306-20 (1987); Ossola,
Work for hire: A Judicial Quagmire and a Legislative Solution, 17 J. ARTS MGMT. & L., Fall 1987, at
23, 26-27.
19. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 362. Reid provides the Court its first opportunity to analyze the doctrine.
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized the work-for-hire doctrine in 1903, but has not examined
the doctrine since then. The issue was before the Court in Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover,
369 U.S. 111 (1962) (per curiam), but the Court refused to review the doctrine under Rickover's
sketchy record. Id. at 113.
20. Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88 (1909); see infra notes 46-56 and
accompanying text.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982); see infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 72-101 and accompanying text.
23. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1487 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
24. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1454 (D.D.C. 1987),
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to donate his services to the project. 25 Reid agreed to sculpt the figures for
"Third World America" if CCNV would pay for his materials and provide a
base for the sculpture.2 6 Neither party mentioned copyright. 27
"Third World America" was completed28 and exhibited in Washington, 29
but CCNV and Reid could not agree on a schedule of exhibitions in other cit-
ies. 3 0 Both claimed copyright in the work and CCNV sued Reid for a determi-
nation of copyright ownership. 31
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that
"Third World America" was a work made for hire whose copyright was owned
exclusively by CCNV,32 but the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed.3 3 Interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act's work-
for-hire provisions for the first time, the court of appeals followed the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit34 and adopted a "literal" interpre-
rev'd, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988). CCNV also determined that
the figures should be life-sized, the family should be black because most of the homeless in Washing-
ton were black, the steam grate should emit simulated steam, and the platform should be inscribed
"and still there is no room at the inn." Id.
25. Id.
26. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1487. The base included the steam grate and equipment to create simu-
lated steam.
27. Id.
28. CCNV hired a cabinetmaker to construct the base, Reid, 846 F.2d at 1487, and ordered
special-effects equipment from Hollywood to create simulated steam. Reid, 652 F. Supp. at 1455.
This was not CCNV's only contact with Hollywood. CCNV received $150,000 in royalties from
"Samaritan," a CBS television movie depicting CCNV's struggles to help the homeless. Brief for
Appellees Community for Creative Non-Violence and Mitchell D. Snyder at 5, Reid, 846 F.2d 1485
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-7051), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988). Reid worked on his portion of
the sculpture for several months, changing the form and arrangement of the figures to accommodate
CCNV's requests. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1487. On Christmas Eve, Reid delivered the work to Washing-
ton and the figures were attached to the base.
29. Pageant officials rejected "Third World America" because it contained a political message,
but CCNV exhibited it nearby. Reid, 652 F. Supp. at 1455 n.6.
30. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1488. CCNV planned a tour of several cities to raise money for the
homeless, but Reid contended that the material used to cast the figures-a synthetic substance
painted to resemble bronze-was too delicate to withstand such an ambitious itinerary. Id. at 1487-
88. The sculpture had already been damaged en route to Washington. Id. at 1488. Reid planned a
more moderate exhibition tour of his own. Id.
31. Id. The dispute between CCNV and Reid concerns only ownership of the copyright in
"Third World America," not ownership of the sculpture itself. Id. at 1488 n.4; see 17 U.S.C. § 202(1982) (ownership of copyright is distinct from ownership of the material object in which it is em-
bodied). CCNV paid for and owns the sculpture. The owner of a copy of a copyrighted work, such
as a book, or the original "copy," such as a sculpture like "Third World America" (the term copy
"includes the material object.., in which the work is first fixed," 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)), is entitled
to display that copy publicly without the permission of the copyright owner, 17 U.S.C. § 109(c); see
Reid, 846 F.2d at 1488 n.4. Therefore, even if Reid were the exclusive owner of the copyright in
"Third World America," he arguably had no right to prevent CCNV's planned tour of the work. As
an author, Reid might have rights against CCNV if it displayed an excessively mutilated or altered
version of the sculpture. Id. at 1498; see Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 23-25
(2d Cir. 1976) (integrity of original work by British comedy troupe "Monty Python" impaired by
broadcast of edited version).
32. Reid, 652 F. Supp. at 1453.
33. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1499.
34. Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
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tation of the statute,35 using general principles of agency law to determine
whether Reid was an "employee" whose creation was a work made for hire.3 6
In an opinion by Judge Ginsburg, the court held that Reid was an independent
contractor and therefore "Third World America" was not a work made for
hire.37 The court refused to name Reid the exclusive owner of the copyright,
however, and remanded the case to determine whether "Third World America"
was a joint work whose copyright was co-owned by CCNV and Reid.38
The basic rule of copyright ownership is that copyright vests initially in the
author or creator of a copyrightable work, 39 who may subsequently transfer all
or part of that copyright to others. 4° The work-for-hire doctrine is an exception
to this rule: copyright in a work created by an employee vests initially in the
35. For a discussion of the literal interpretation of the work-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act,
see infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
36. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1494.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1495-98, 1499; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a) (1982) (joint work is a work prepared by
two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into a unitary whole;
authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright). The court noted that both CCNV and Reid
engaged others to assist them with "Third World America," who may qualify as coauthors and
would need to be joined in the action below. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1497-98.
39. Ossola, supra note 18, at 24.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1982). Any work that is "original" and "fixed in [a] tangible me-
dium of expression" is copyrightable. Id. § 102(a). The originality requirement is not stringent.
"'Original' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work 'owes its origin' to the
'author.'" Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (quoting
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 11 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884)). The work does not need to be
novel or "nonobvious," as an invention must be to obtain a patent nor must it reach a particular
level of artistic merit. W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 18 (6th ed. 1986). A work is
fixed in a tangible medium of expression if it can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Ideas are
not copyrightable, however: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied. ..
Id. § 102(b).
Copyright owners have five exclusive rights in a copyrighted work: I) to make copies of the
work; 2) to make "derivative" works based on the copyrighted work; 3) to sell or rent copies of the
work; 4) to perform the work publicly; and 5) to display the work publicly. Id. § 106. Any of these
rights may be transferred, and the owner of a particular exclusive right is given the same protections
and remedies as the copyright owner. Id. § 201(d)(2).
The 1976 Act fundamentally changed the way federal copyrights are obtained. Under the 1909
Act, an author obtained federal copyright protection by registering the work with the Copyright
Office or publishing the work with notice of copyright. Pub. L. No. 80-281, ch. 391, §§ 10, 12, 61
Stat. 652, 656 (1947) (repealed 1976). Unpublished works were protected by state law, known as
"common-law copyright." R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 7 (4th ed. 1985)
(The "common-law" designation was somewhat erroneous because much of state copyright law was
statutory, but the name was used to distinguish it from federal copyright, known as "statutory copy-
right."). Registration or publication with notice divested the owner of common-law copyright, and
simultaneously replaced it with federal copyright. Publication without notice or prior registration
also divested common-law copyright, placing the work in the public domain. Once a work entered
the public domain, it was ineligible for federal protection. The 1976 Act did away with this dual
system of copyright protection, which had been a hallmark of United States copyright law since the
first Copyright Act of 1790. Latman, A Glimpse at the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y U.S.A. 77, 78 (1977). Under the 1976 Act a work is protected by federal copyright the mo-
ment it becomes fixed in a tangible medium of expression; state law is expressly preempted. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 301 (1982). This single federal system of protection for all original works of au-
thorship, published or unpublished, registered or unregistered, from the moment they are fixed in a
tangible medium is the 1976 Act's most significant innovation. Latman, supra.
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employer, who is considered the "author" of the work under the copyright stat-
ute.4 ' The doctrine was implicitly accepted in judicial decisions at the turn of
the century,42 but was not formally recognized until the Copyright Act of
1909.43 The 1909 Act simply declared that "[i]n the interpretation and con-
struction of this title,... the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case
of works made for hire."44 This skeletal framework for the doctrine was devel-
oped by the courts. 45
At first, the courts applied the doctrine only to works created by regular,
salaried employees during the course of their employment.46 Commissioned
works were governed by a separate rule: copyright vested initially in the in-
dependent contractor, but the contractor was presumed to transfer that copy-
right to the commissioning party.47 The presumption was rebuttable. 48
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). For a discussion of the work-for-hire doctrine under the
1976 Act, see infra notes 70-101 and accompanying text.
42. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 242 (1903) has been cited as the
origin of the doctrine. See, eg., Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir.
1987); Simon, supra note 17, at 487; Annotation, Application of "Work for Hire" Doctrine Under
Federal Copyright Act, 11 A.L.R.FED. 457, 461-62 (1976). The doctrine was recognized before Bleis-
tein, however. See. e.g., Colliery Eng'r Co. v. United Correspondence Schools Co., 94 F. 152, 153
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899) (literary product of salaried employee became property of employer, who could
copyright it). But see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPY-
RIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY No. 13, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION 129 (Comm.
Print 1960) [hereinafter REVISION STUDY No. 13] (older cases support copyright ownership, but not
authorship by employer), reprinted in 1 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
(G. Grossman ed. 1976).
43. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88 (1909)
(repealed 1947); Pub. L. No. 80-281, ch. 391, § 26, 61 Stat. 652, 659-60 (1947) (repealed 1976).
44. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88 (1909)
(repealed 1947). The odd wording of the statute--calling an employer the "author" of a work made
for hire-stems from Congress's constitutional power "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The constitutionality of the
work-for-hire doctrine has been questioned. See I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 8,
§ 1.06(C). This treatise concludes that the doctrine passes constitutional muster because § 201(b)
allows the parties to "agree otherwise" that the employee owns the copyright in a work made for
hire. Id. § 1.06(C). No court has decided whether it is constitutional to treat an employer and not
the true creator of a work as its author, Simon, supra note 17, at 487, 511, but dicta suggest that any
principle depriving an author of copyright and vesting that right in another should be narrowly
confined, see, e.g., Sherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970).
45. The 1909 Act contained a number of ambiguities requiring judicial interpretation. Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 857 (1987); see also B.
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 40 (1967) ("the text of the [1909] statute has a
maddeningly casual prolixity and imprecision throughout" and "leaves the development of funda-
mentals to the judges").
46. See, e.g., Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp. 191, 193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
aff'd sub nom. Gumm v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 158 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (work of
salaried employee created in course of employment held to be work-for-hire); United States Ozone
Co. v. United States Ozone Co. of America, 62 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1932) (treatise prepared by
employee as part of his employment duties; copyright in employee's name held in trust for em-
ployer); National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215, 217 (C.C.M.D. Pa. 1911).
47. See, e.g., Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939) ("copyright
should be held to have passed with the painting, unless the plaintiff can prove that the parties in-
tended it to be reserved to the artist"), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940). The presumption existed
before the formulation of the work-for-hire doctrine. See Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892, 894 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1900) (burden of proving that artist retains copyright in work of art executed, sold, and deliv-
ered under commission is upon the artist); cf Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 81 F.2d 373,
1989]
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As late as 1958, a Copyright Office study surveying case law in this area
observed that the work-for-hire doctrine applied only to works made by salaried
employees in the regular course of their employment.4 9 The distinction between
works created by employees and those created by independent contractors began
to break down,5 0 however, and in 1966 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit applied the work-for-hire doctrine to an independent con-
tractor for the first time. 51 The presumption that a free-lance creator assigned
his copyright to the commissioning party was replaced by a presumption that
the commissioning party owned the copyright as an employer-author under the
work-for-hire doctrine.52 The hiring party's right to control the production of
the work became the crucial factor in finding a work-for-hire relationship.53 A
"right to control" existed any time the hiring party paid for the work and had
the power to refuse to accept it.54 Because this right did not have to be exer-
cised, the presumption that the commissioning party was an employer was diffi-
cult to rebut.55 By the time the Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted, the courts
376 (lst Cir.) (presumption is that independent contractor retains copyright unless contract carries
implied assignment to commissioning party), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936).
Early cases involving photographic portraits held that copyright belonged to the commissioning
party, but it is not clear whether courts relied on a work-for-hire theory or a presumption of transfer
theory. See, eg., Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib. Corp., 280 F. 550, 552 (2d Cir.) (right of
copyright held to be "in" the sitter, or the person paying for the sitter to be photographed), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 583 (1922); Lumiere v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 275 F. 428, 428 (2d Cir. 1921) (pa-
tron paying photographer to take photograph is entitled to copyright); Altman v. New Haven Union
Co., 254 F. 113, 118 (D. Conn. 1918) ("Where the photographer takes the portrait for the sitter
under employment by the latter, it is the implied agreement that the property in the portrait is in the
sitter.").
48. Hartfield v. Herzfeld, 60 F.2d 599, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (undisputed facts and circum-
stances made it clear there was no mutual intention that compiler of commercial code give copyright
to commissioning party); W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 82, 88 (6th
Cir. 1928) (because plaintiff was independent contractor and not employee, court may infer plaintiff
did not intend to sell copyright for "a sum less than the bare cost of the work").
49. RavisION STUDY No. 13, supra note 42, at 130; see, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1955).
50. See, eg., Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965):
[W]hen one party engages another, whether as employee or as an independent contractor,
to produce a work of an artistic nature,... in the absence of an express contractual reser-
vation of the copyright in the artist, the presumption arises that the mutual intent of the
parties is that the title to the copyright shall be in the party at whose instance and expense
the work is done.
Id.
51. Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir.
1966). The court reasoned that the doctrine "is applicable whenever an employee's work is pro-
duced at the instance and expense of his employer," and saw "no sound reason" not to apply the
doctrine to independent contractors. Id.; see also Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213,
1216-17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972) ("[t]he purpose of the statute is not to be frus-
trated by conceptualistic formulations of the employment relationship"; plaintiff "acted in the capac-
ity of an independent contractor does not preclude a finding that the song was done for hire").
52. Hardy, supra note 17, at 242.
53. Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); Sherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970); Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d
639, 643 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968).
54. Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters,, 815 F.2d 323, 327
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988); see, e.g., Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1217.
55. See, e.g., Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1978).
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considered anyone who paid another to create a copyrightable work to be the
statutory author of the work under the work-for-hire doctrine.56
The shift in 1966 from a rule of presumed assignment to the work-for-hire
doctrine is significant for two reasons. First, the Copyright Act of 1976 would
have eliminated the pre-1966 presumption. Transfers of copyright cannot be
presumed under the 1976 Act;5 7 transfers must be in writing.58 Absent the
work-for-hire doctrine, free-lance creators would own copyrights in all of the
works they create. Second, the shift did not take place until 1966, one year after
the work-for-hire provisions of the 1976 Act were drafted. 59
The final version of the Copyright Act of 1976 explains that:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by [both of] them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright. 60
A "work made for hire" is-
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use [1] as a con-
tribution to a collective work, [2] as part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, [3] as a translation, [4] as a supplementary work, [5]
as a compilation, [6] as an instructional text, [7] as a test, [8] as answer
material for a test, or [9] as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire.61
These provisions were the result of a compromise between authors' and
composers' groups and their publishers.62 The 1963 Preliminary Draft Bill
56. Easter Seal Soc'v, 815 F.2d at 326-27; see, e.g., Siegel v. National Periodical Publications,
Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974) (work-for-hire doctrine applies when work is produced "at the
instance and expense" of the employer). For a brief but thorough discussion of the development of
the work-for-hire doctrine under the 1909 Act, see Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 325-27.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982) (transfer of object in which copyright is fixed does not transfer
copyright in the work).
58. Id. § 204(a).
59. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
61. Id. § 101 (bracketed numbers added).
62. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 89th Congress, 1st Sess. 136-37 (1966)
[hereinafter Copyright Law Revision Part 1] (statement of Horace S. Manges, Counsel to American
Book Publishers Council, Inc.), reprinted in 5 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY (G. Grossman ed. 1976); id. at 148-49 (supplemental statement of American Book Publishers
Council, Inc.); Memorandum of American Book Publishers Council, Inc., American Guild of Authors
& Composers, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, American Textbook Publishers
Institute, The Authors League of America, Inc., Composers and Lyricists Guild of America, Inc.;
Music Publishers' Protective Association, Inc, Music Publishers of the United States, Re H.R. 4347,
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1965) [hereinafter
Joint Memorandum], reprinted in 5 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G.
Grossman ed. 1976); STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
COPYRIGHT REVISION, PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
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would have defined a work made for hire as "a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of the duties of his employment, but not including a work made
on special order or commission." 63 Publishers objected to this definition, 64 so
the 1964 bill included "a work prepared on special order or commission if the
parties expressly agree in writing that it shall be considered a work made for
hire."'65 Authors, naturally, disliked this change66 and both sides agreed to a
compromise: only specific categories of commissioned works could become
works for hire.67 The compromise was incorporated in the 1965 bill as "a work
specially ordered or commissioned for use as... [the first four categories of the
present definition], if the parties expressly agree in writing that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire."68 The 1976 Act added a few categories to the
list of commissioned works that could be considered works made for hire, but
the basic definition of work-for-hire enacted in the 1976 Act appeared in the
1965 bill.69
When this basic definition of work-for-hire was formulated in 1965, the
work-for-hire doctrine applied only to regular, salaried employees.70 By 1976,
when the definition was enacted, courts had expanded the concept of "employ-
ees" for the purposes of copyright law to include independent contractors. 71
The 1976 Act does not define the term "employee." Did Congress adopt the
broad 1976 concept of "employees," the narrow 1965 concept of "employees,"
or something in between?
One commentator has advocated a "conservative" interpretation of the
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 66-68 (Comm.
Print 1965) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT], reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 1976).
For brief but thorough discussions of the legislative history of the work-for-hire provisions in
the 1976 Act, see W. PATRY, supra note 40, at 118-22; Ossola, supra note 18, at 31-35. For a more
detailed discussion, see Hardy, supra note 17, at 221-41.
63. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT REVI-
SION, PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW AND DIS-
CUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 15 n.II (Comm. Print 1964), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS
COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 1976).
64. Id. at 274, reprinted in OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Gross-
man ed. 1976).
65. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT REVI-
SION, PART 5: 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS § 54 at 31 (Comm. Print
1965), reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed.
1976).
66. See id. at 146-48 (comments of Irwin Karp, Counsel to The Authors League of America,
Inc.), reprinted in OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 1976).
67. Joint Memorandum, supra note 62, at 134, reprinted in OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 1976).
68. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1965) reprinted in Copyright Law Revision Part 1,
supra note 62, at 3-4.
69. See supra text accompanying note 61; compare H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101
(1965) (1965 bill lists only four categories) with 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (present bill contains nine
categories).
70. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. The application of the doctrine to independ-
ent contractors was foreshadowed by Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300
(9th Cir. 1965), but Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68
(2d Cir. 1966), was the first express application. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
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1976 Act's work-for-hire provisions.72 According to this view, the 1976 Act did
not change the expansive concept of "employees" that had developed between
1966 and 1976; the hiring party's "right to control" the production of a specially
commissioned work remained the crucial factor in establishing an employer-em-
ployee relationship. 73 Therefore, a work by an independent contractor falls
under the first clause of the definition of a work made for hire, "a work prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment." 74 Clause number
two 75 is said to carve out a narrow exemption for nine specific kinds of commis-
sioned works, which can be works for hire only if the parties sign a written
agreement. 76 This interpretation has been criticized as
mak[ing] the nine narrow categories in § 101(2) completely mysteri-
ous.... The activities in § 101(2) look like the kind of activities where
the [commissioning party] normally wants and needs to be a statutory
author in order to gain complete initial ownership of a collaborative
project. It would be anomalous to give these activities special protec-
tions beyond those accorded other types of commissioned works.77
A few courts have adopted the conservative interpretation. 78
The vast majority of commentators79 advocate a "literal" interpretation of
the new work-for-hire provisions, and this interpretation has been adopted by a
number of courts.8 0 Under the literal view, the two clauses defining works made
for hire are mutually exclusive: the first clause refers to works created by em-
ployees and the second clause refers to works created by independent contrac-
tors.8 ' A work prepared by an employee is a work made for hire only if it was
prepared within the scope of employment.82 A work ordered from an independ-
ent contractor is a work made for hire only if it falls into one of nine specific
categories and the parties have agreed in writing that the copyright belongs to
the party commissioning the work. 83 This interpretation is a radical departure
72. O'Meara, "Works Made for Hire" Under the Copyright Act of 1976-Two Interpretations,
15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 523, 527-28, 532-39 (1982).
73. See id. at 528, 533.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see supra text accompanying note 61.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see supra text accompanying note 61.
76. O'Meara, supra note 72, at 528.
77. Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 331
(5th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988). The interpretation has also been criticized as
"demonstrably incorrect." Hardy, supra note 17, at 244 & nn.48 & 145 (citing SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT, supra note 62, 67-68 (commissioned works not falling within one of the enumerated catego-
ries would not come within the definition of works made for hire).
78. Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985); Town of Clarkstown v.
Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141-43 (S.D.N.Y 1983).
79. See supra note 13.
80. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1494 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988); Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334. Earlier district court decisions
had implicitly recognized the literal interpretation. See, eg., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Labo-
ratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (work-for-hire
finding not challenged on appeal), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); Childers v. High Soe'y Maga-
zine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); BPI Sys., Inc. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 210
(W.D. Tex. 1981).




NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
from the work-for-hire doctrine that existed in 1976, but is only a slight expan-
sion of the doctrine as it was applied in 1965.
The literal view actually encompasses two interpretations of the 1976 Act.
Although proponents of the literal view agree that the term "employee" does not
include an independent contractor, they disagree on a more precise definition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit8 4 and several scholars
believe that the term refers only to formal, salaried employees.85 This Note will
refer to this view as the "formal employee" version of the literal interpretation.
Others believe that the term "employee" should be construed under general
agency principles, because "scope of employment" is a term of art in agency
law.8 6 This position was adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in Reid 87
and will be called the "agency law" version of the literal interpretation.
A third interpretation is a compromise between the conservative view that
almost all commissioned works are works made for hire and the literal view that
only a few types of commissioned works are works made for hire. The "compro-
mise" view was devised by the Second Circuit in Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spie-
gel Inc. 88 Like the proponents of the conservative view,89 the Second Circuit
84. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). This decision was handed down
after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Reid, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
85. See, eg., W. PATRY, supra note 40, at 122; Hardy, supra note 17, at 221-22; Ossola, supra
note 18, at 34. These scholars argue that the drafters of the 1976 Act's work-for-hire provisions
intended for the word "employee" to mean a "regular" or salaried employee. They present two
reasons why the drafters chose this meaning. Mr. Ossola and Professor Patry assert that the drafters
adopted this meaning because the Copyright Office interpreted the term that way. See W. PATRY,
supra note 40, at 119, 122; Ossola, supra note 18, at 32, 34. Professor Hardy believes that the
drafters adopted this meaning because the courts interpreted the term that way in 1965, the year the
provisions were written. See Hardy, supra note 17, at 221-46.
86. See, ag., Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d
323, 334 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988); Brunswick Beacon v. Schock-Hopchas
Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1987); 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 8,
§ 5.03[B][1], at 5-12. The courts following this view use common-law principles listed in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a)-(j) (1958) to determine whether one acting for another is
an employee or an independent contractor:
In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor,
the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, master may exercise over the details of
the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually
done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the
place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating a relation of master and servant;
and
(0) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Id.
87. 846 F.2d at 1494.
88. 738 F.2d at 548, 552 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
89. For a discussion of the conservative interpretation of the 1976 Act's work-for-hire provi-
sions, see infra text accompanying notes 72-78.
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believes that independent contractors may be considered "employees" under the
first clause of the definition of work-for-hire. 90 Unlike the proponents of the
conservative view, however, the Second Circuit believes that Congress did intend
to narrow the expansive use of the term "employee." 9 1 According to the Aldon
Accessories court, Congress felt that the presumption that works prepared by
independent contractors were works made for hire "worked an injustice in those
situations where the contractor did all of the creative work and the hiring party
did little or nothing."'92 Therefore, the new work-for-hire provisions reverse this
presumption when the hiring party does not actually control the production of
the work.93 The Aldon Accessories compromise treats a contractor as an em-
ployee for copyright purposes only if "the contractor [is] so controlled and su-
pervised in the creation of the particular work by the employing party that an
employer-employee relationship exists."'94 If the contractor is strictly super-
vised, her work is a work-for-hire under the "work prepared by an employee"
clause.95 If the contractor were truly independent, her work would be covered
by the "commissioned works" clause.
96
Several courts have adopted the Aldon Accessories compromise as the defini-
tive interpretation of work-for-hire under the 1976 Act.97 However, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits
have expressly rejected the reasoning of Aldon Accessories.98 Critics maintain
that the Aldon Accessories compromise was unnecessary because the same result
could have been reached under a joint work theory: any plaintiff who actually
controls an independent contractor should be the coauthor of a joint work.99
Both the Aldon Accessories compromise and the agency law version of the
literal interpretation use agency law principles to establish work-for-hire sta-
tus.10 The only difference is that Aldon Accessories examines the control exer-
cised by a hiring party over a specific work and the agency law version of the
literal interpretation examines the hiring parties' relationship as a whole.' 0 1





95. Id. at 552-53.
96. See id. at 552.
97. See, eg., Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.), cerL
denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Marshall v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (N.D.
Ill. 1986). Evans Newton has been criticized for failing to require the same degree of actual control
by the hiring party as Aldon Accessories, Hardy, supra note 17, at 212, 217-18, 248, and for sliding
toward the "right to control" standard developed under the 1909 Act, Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled
Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1280 (1988).
98. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1103-05 (9th Cir. 1989); Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1494 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988); Easter
Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 333-34.
99. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1491; Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 333; Hamilton, supra note 18, at
1302. For a description of joint works, see supra note 38.
100. See Hardy, supra note 17, at 256-57.
101. Hardy, supra note 17, at 256-57. Professor Hardy argues that the actual control test and
the general agency law test will reach equally unpredictable results. Id. at 256.
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The Reid opinion surveyed three of the interpretations described above: the
conservative approach, 10 2 the Aldon Accessories approach, 03 and the agency
law version of the literal approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal
Society for Crippled Children and Adults v. Playboy Enterprises.104 The court
quoted at length the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Easter Seal Society, wholeheart-
edly endorsing its choice of a literal interpretation and summarily dismissing
two reservations the Fifth Circuit voiced when adopting a literal interpreta-
tion.10 5 The Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Society had justified its choice of agency
law as the means to determine who is and is not an "employee" under the stat-
ute, 10 6 but the District of Columbia Circuit in Reid did not discuss the issue at
all. The court simply stated that it had selected "the" literal interpretation of
the statute and used agency law principles to apply that interpretation to the
facts at hand.10 7
The Reid court's choice of one version of the literal view over another was
not dispositive of the ownership of "Third World America's" copyright, how-
ever.108 Even under the broader agency law view,10 9 Reid was regarded as an
independent contractor. Therefore, he could not have been an "employee"
under either version of the literal interpretation. The court conceded that the
result would have been different if it had followed the compromise interpretation
102. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1489-94, see supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
103. Id.; see supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
104. Id. (citing Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy Enters. 815 F.2d
323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988)); see supra notes 81-83 & 86-87 and accom-
panying text.
105. Id. at 1492-94. The Easter Seal Society court thought that § 201(b)'s language, "[i]n the
case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author for purposes of this title," sounded like an affirmation of the 1909 Act work-
for-hire doctrine. 815 F.2d at 330. The Fifth Circuit considered the language too broad to refer to
the narrow class of persons who could be authors of specially commissioned works under the "com-
missioned works clause of § 101. Id. The Reid court disagreed. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1494. The Fifth
Circuit was also concerned that Congress did not express a clear intent to fundamentally alter the
works for hire doctrine. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 330-31. The District of Columbia Circuit
opinion in Reid also saw no difficulty. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1494.
106. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 335-36. The court's reasons were: 1) the phrase "scope of
employment" is a term of art in agency law; 2) the meaning of work-for-hire is tied to a well-
developed doctrine in agency law; 3) it gives buyers and sellers of copyrightable works the greatest
predictability; and 4) adopting an agency law definition creates a "certain moral symmetry"-a
buyer is a statutory author only when he would be liable for the seller's negligence under respondeat
superior. Id. at 335. But see infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (policy behind tort law's
respondeat superior doctrine does not apply in copyright context).
107. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1494.
108. For a discussion of the two literal interpretations of the Act, see supra notes 84-87 and
accompanying text. Because Reid was an independent contractor, he was the author of "Third
World America" and owned copyright in the work. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1495. The court was not
willing to declare that Reid was the sole owner of the copyright, however. Id. The court remanded
for a determination whether CCNV and others were joint authors of "Third World America" and
co-owners of its copyright. Id. at 1497-98. If that is the case, Reid and the other owners hold
copyright in "Third World America" as tenants in common. Id. at 1498; see H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 5659, 5736, and in 7
OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 1976).
109. This view examines a number of factors when determining whether an individual is an
employee. See supra note 86. The formal employee view regards only regular, salaried employees as
"employees" under the copyright statute.
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of the Second Circuit. 110 Presumably, CCNV had exercised, enough actual con-
trol over the production of "Third World America" to create an employer-em-
ployee relationship under the compromise view.
The Reid court's choice of a literal, rather than a conservative or compro-
mise interpretation of the new work-for-hire provisions is logical from a textual
viewpoint. The statute appears to create a simple dichotomy: "[a] 'work made
for hire' is--(1) a work prepared by an employee ... ; or (2) a work specially
ordered or commissioned. . . ." "11 Legislative history1 12 also supports a literal
interpretation of the statute. The definition of work-for-hire that was incorpo-
rated into the Copyright Act of 1976 was a compromise between a definition
that had excluded commissioned works altogether and a definition that included
all commissioned works. 113
The court's choice of agency law as the means to determine who is a copy-
right "employee" is not supported by legislative history, however. The legisla-
tive history of the 1976 Act is unusual in that many of its substantive provisions
date from the early 1960s' 14 and were written by industry representatives rather
than legal scholars or members of Congress. 115 When authors', composers', and
publishers' groups endorsed a definition of work made for hire in 1965, the
courts defined the term "employee" as a traditional, salaried employee.1 16 After
1965 Congress considered the ownership provisions of the new copyright act
settled' 17 and focused on other matters. 118 There is no evidence that anyone
participating in the copyright revision process became aware of the line of cases
expanding the work-for-hire doctrine.1 19 Had Congress intended to change the
meaning originally given the word "employee" to comport with later case law, it
surely would have said so. 120
Practical considerations point to a definition of copyright "employees" as
regular, salaried employees. Determining that an individual is a formal em-
ployee is far simpler than determining that he is an employee under agency law.
Payroll withholding records can be consulted to determine whether someone is a
formal employee.121 By contrast, the Restatement of Agency lists ten factors to
110. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1497 n.18.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); Easter Seal Soe'y for Crippled Children & Adults v. Playboy En-
ters., 815 F.2d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
112. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
114. Ossola, supra note 18, at 13.
115. Hamilton, supra note 18, at 1281; Litman, supra note 45, at 880-81.
116. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
117. Litman, supra note 45, at 901.
118. For a decade, controversy over the scope of rights kept copyright revision efforts at stand-
still. Latman, supra note 40, at 80-81. The obligation of cable television operators to make contribu-
tions to copyright owners was the center of the controversy. See R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, supra
note 40, at 417; Latman, supra note 40, at 82. The problem was finally resolved by a compulsory
licensing system. See 17 U.S.C. § Ill (1982).
119. Litman, supra note 45, at 901.
120. See Hardy, supra note 17, at 242-43.
121. See Fitzgibbon & Kendall, The Unicorn in the Courtroom: The Concept of "Supervising and
Directing" an Artistic Creation Is a Mythical Beast in the Copyright Law, 15 J. ARTS MGMT. & L.,
Fall 1985, at 23, 32 (first earmark of a regular employee is that employer withholds federal and state
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be weighed when determining whether someone acting for another is an em-
ployee or an independent contractor. 122 The use of a straightforward definition
of an "employee" whose work is "for hire" will create certainty and stability in
the marketplace.
Public policy also points to a narrow definition of the term "employee." In
tort law, policy favors finding a closer relation between the parties than they
may have intended in order to fix liability on the person best able to bear a
financial loss.123 Thus, an independent contractor may be regarded as an "em-
ployee" under the doctrine of respondeat superior, allowing an injured plaintiff to
reach the "deep pocket" of a wealthy "employer." Such a broad view of the
employer-employee relationship does not similarly advance the goals of copy-
right law. The purpose of copyright protection is to encourage creative activity
by rewarding authors. 124 Accordingly, the artificial treatment of employers as
statutory "authors" should be limited to a true employment relationship. 125
Reid correctly chose a literal interpretation of the work-for-hire provisions
in the Copyright Act of 1976, but the court's use of agency law to determine
who is and is not an employee under the Act appears misguided. The work-for-
hire doctrine is in dire need of clarification by the Supreme Court or Congress.
Either version of the literal interpretation-the formal employee view that treats
only regular, salaried employees as "employees" under the copyright statute, or
the agency law view that uses a broader test-would lend much-needed stability
to the doctrine. But applying the work-for-hire doctrine only to formal employ-
ees is simpler, more predictable, and closer to congressional intent than applying
the doctrine to agency law employees.
MAMIE DEATON LUCAS
payroll taxes, social security (FICA), and union dues). Senator Thad Cochran (D-Miss.) has intro-
duced legislation to clarify the work-for-hire doctrine by "confin[ing] the work-for-hire doctrine to
the traditional employment relationship-the situation it was designed to address." 133 CONG. REC.
S6,737 (daily ed. May 19, 1987) (statement of Senator Cochran); see S. 1223, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); S. 2330, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 132 CONG. REC.
84494 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1986). These bills would require that the employer withhold state and
federal income taxes from an "employee" who creates a work made for hire. See, e.g., Artists Bill of
Rights, S. 1223, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a)-(j) (1958); see supra note 86.
123. Fitzgibbon & Kendall, supra note 121, at 33.
124. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (economic philosophy behind copyright is that
encouraging individual effort through personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare;
"[s]acrifical days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards.").
125. But see Hardy, An Economic Understanding of Copyright Law's Work.Made.for-Hire Doc-
trine, 12 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 181, 181, 227 (1988). Professor Hardy argues that courts feel an
obligation to give rights to the "deep pocket" in copyright cases because the wealthier hiring party is
in a better position to exploit the work and bring it to the public's attention. Id. at 181. Professor
Hardy concludes, however, that Congress intended the 1976 Act's work-for-hire provisions to favor
the creator over the exploiter of a work and any tension between the judicial goal of maximizing
public access to a work by awarding copyright ownership to the better exploiter and a more limited
congressional intent should be resolved by following congressional intent. Id. at 227.
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